This post is somewhat of a continuation of my post about climate change sensationalism, however this time instead of focusing on the case of Tuvalu I want to broaden my focus and explore the discourses associated with the term 'climate refugee'.
The term climate refugee first emerged in 1988 in a publication by the Worldwatch Institute and since then the use of this category has become widespread in both policy documents and the media (McNamara and Gibson, 2009). However, a number of concerns have been expressed over the use of such a category and these are what I shall now explore.
Hartmann (2010) sees the term 'climate refugee' as being born from something she calls the 'degradation narrative'. In this narrative population pressure in poor countries leads to over-intensive farming practices which result in environmental degradation and thus the need for migration as the land can no longer support the incumbent population. The narrative continues that people migrate to other rural areas where this same process is then repeated or to urban areas where population growth places a strain on existing urban resources which can result in political instability.
While such a narrative has been widely critiqued it has gained popularity in western policy as it explains poverty as the result of population pressure instead of reform and in addition it blames the poor for environmental degradation while ignoring the role of commercial agriculture and extractive industries. Furthermore it frames migration as something which is both a threat to the environment and to security.
A concern expressed by Hartmann (2010), is that as the term 'climate refugee' is born from the degradation narrative it has security issues tied up with it. In this sense she sees the use of this term along with another term, 'climate conflict', as only helping to further the aims of national security actors. This is as the narrative of crisis, with which this term is linked, results in the militarisation of the issues of climate policy and development aid. As a result Hartmann thinks that this term is more likely to undermine any efforts with respect to the mitigation and adaptation to climate change and result in the blurring of the distinction between military assistance and development.
This brings me on to the next concern put forward by McNamara and Gibson (2009), which also has its foundations in the manner in which the term 'climate refugee' has been constructed. In this paper McNamara and Gibson look at how this term has been developed both by NGOs and the media. They see this term as being created through sensationalist narratives of climate catastrophe which portray those who are affected by climate change as being weak, helpless and vulnerable victims of a problem that they contributed little to. As such, the use of this term has meant that the focus of dealing with future climate change has been concentrated on where affected people can be relocated to, for example Brown (2001) proposed that the UN should create a climate-immigration quota system.
However, many of the nations facing the greatest threat due to climate change have strongly resisted the label of 'climate refugees'. While the narratives associated with this term are those of future climate catastrophe, this is not the future that those under the most severe threats envision for themselves. These people see a future where they rally against the impacts of climate change through local adaptation as well as seeking global action to mitigate future climate change. This sentiment is well evidenced by this quote by President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom of the Republic of the Maldives:
“We don’t want no sea level rise. There must be a way out. Neither the Maldives nor any small island nation wants to drown. That’s for sure. Neither do we want our lands eroded, or our economies destroyed. Nor do we want to become environmental refugees either. We want to stand up and fight. All we ask is that the more affluent nations and the international community in general, help us in this fight . ”
Rather than seeing his country and it's people as weak, vulnerable and helpless, his view is of a people who have the ability to adapt to future climate change without resorting to migration. This is the case for many societies under threat - they resist the label of 'climate refugees' as they do not want to be portrayed as weak or passive. Instead they are proud people with a deep sense of national pride who want to act to save the country that they belong to and maintain their sovereignty. Many Pacific ambassadors spoken to in the aforementioned study viewed the focus on migration as a globally irresponsible vision for the future. The point is put forward that if the only future adaptation solution discussed is migration then you lose the premise to persuade major polluters to reduce emissions and prevent any further damage to the nations that are already under threat.
McNamara and Gibson some up this issue well when they say:
“At the heart of the contestation over the category of ‘climate refugees’ is a geopolitical tension between visions for the future. The vision for the future validating the category of ‘climate refugees’ is based on Pacific islands (as weaker, marginal nations) having to adapt in the most extreme way to problems created by large, polluting nations (rather than those polluting nations curbing their own emissions as ‘the solution’). In contrast, Pacific nation ambassadors envision a future as self-determining nation-states, and thus, strongly resist media/policy discourses that legitimise their possible future displacement en masse. ”
I hope this post didn't overlap to much with my previous post about climate sensationalism however on reading these papers I felt compelled to share how a term that is widely used without second thought is actually linked to very negative discourses of future climate change, so much so that those most affected by climate change wish to avoid having this label attached to them.
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