Climate Change and Mortality

In much of this blog I have explored the threat of rising sea levels and the impact that this is likely to have on a number of societies. However, in this post I now want to change my focus somewhat and look at the how human health may be directly linked to rising temperatures.

Non-infectious health effects

Heat related mortality occurs mainly when there is a large difference between temperature extremes and the mean climate, for example people are most at risk at the start of summer when they have not acclimatised to higher temperatures. For example across Europe during the first two weeks in august 2003 as many as 45000 heat related deaths were reported (Patz et al,2005).

Non-infectious heat related mortality is not likely to increase due to gradual increases in mean temperature but due to increases in extremes. It is likely that global warming will result in more frequent and more severe heat waves and thus the number of heat related deaths is likely to increase. It is also important to note that the effect of heat waves is amplified in large cities due to the heat island effect and therefore people living in large cities are more vulnerable to heat-related mortality.

I think that the issue of non-infectious health effects is something that is very important to take note of. This is as, living in an affluent western society it is very easy to separate yourself from the issues associated with climate change and see it simply as a problem for those living in less developed countries. However, this issue highlights that global warming truly is a global threat.

Infectious Disease

Infectious agents (bacteria, viruses) and their vector organisms (mosquitoes, ticks etc.) are devoid of thermostatic mechanisms and therefore their reproduction and survival is largely dependent on fluctuations in temperature. Some studies have shown that Malaria transmission is associated with anomalies in maximum temperature while others have suggested that variables such as drug resistance, human migration, land use change or presence of vector control programmes are much more important determinants of the spread of Malaria.  However, Patz et al   point to a study which shows a strong correlation between a warming trend in central Ethiopia between 1968 and 1993 and the increasing prevalence of Malaria. This study took confounding factors such as those mentioned previously into account but found that they were unable to account for the observed trend in the prevalence of Malaria.  Such studies are somewhat controversial due to the varying quality of data that it is possible to obtain, however, there is a strong suggestion that with increasing temperatures Malaria is likely to become increasingly prevalent.

Another extremely serious disease caused by a mosquito borne virus is Dengue haemorrhagic fever. It is well known that the species of Mosquito which is the principle carrier of the dengue virus is largely affected by ecological drivers such as levels of temperature, moisture and solar radiation. As such models have been produced which predict the size of the mosquito population based on a number of climate variables. The results of this model have then been compared to the number of DHF cases and it has been shown that these two variables show a high level of positive correlation. With climate change it can therefore be expected that the number of cases of DHF will rise.

While the previous examples I have given are of tropical diseases these are not the only diseases on which climate has an important effect. For example Patz et al also explain that in continental Europe higher than average temperatures have resulted in a 30% increase in the number of cases of Salmonellosis.

Impacts

The World Health Organization has carried out a study which investigates the global burden of disease which in the year 2000 was attributable to anthropogenic climate change. Their assessment, which Patz et al describe as using extremely conservative assumptions about the link between climate and health, shows that climatic changes which have occurred since the mid-70s are already responsible for around 150,000 deaths per year. This figure is based on estimates of the increase in climate sensitive health outcomes such as cardiovascular disease, diarrhoea, malaria, flooding and malnutrition, all outcomes which quantitative studies of the climate-health relationship have been carried out. The global spatial distribution of mortality due to climate change can be seen in figure 1, from this it is obvious that vulnerability is not globally uniform and therefore any response must be well targeted based on in depth regional assessment if it is to be successful.

Figure 1: WHO estimated mortality per million people by the 2000 due to anthropogenic climate change (Patz et al, 2005)

It has also been estimated that by the year 2030 the risk of various threats to human health will have doubled. Extremely large increases in the risk of flooding are expected with more modest increases in diseases such as malaria and diarrhoea. However, it is important to note that the smaller increase in risk associated with disease is likely to pose the greatest threat to a large number of communities. For example in sub-Saharan Africa flooding kills around 1 person per million per year, compared to malaria which kills 1600 per million and diarrhoea which kills 1000 per million. It is therefore easy to see that even a modest increase in the prevalence of malaria or diarrhoea is likely to have a devastating impact in such areas.

Overall Patz et al conclude that sadly population vulnerability is still very much dependent on economic factors which dictate the ability of a society to adapt. In addition regions where the risk of climate sensitive disease is greatest are also those with the most limited ability to adapt. Again we see an ethical dimension to this crisis, 90% of malaria occurs in Africa a continent with some of the lowest levels of greenhouse gas emissions which have created this problem. It is therefore clear that the emissions of some of the world’s wealthiest countries are putting at increasing risk some of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people who unlike those wealthier nations have little ability to adapt to this growing threat.

Durban Climate Conference - A Global Lifeline?

As you will probably be aware, recently a United Nations Climate Conference took place in Durban running from the 28th of November to the 11th of December. Going into this conference small island nations saw a climate deal as vital to their survival with the Chairman of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) stating “If we don’t act now, some of us will die.” On the last day of this conference a deal was agreed and I think it is only right that a blog which discusses the threat of climate change to societies around the world, and particularly small island states, discusses the outcomes of such a conference. 

At this conference an agreement was made to move away from voluntary targets and to continue to hold up the Kyoto protocol (to which China, Russia and Canada are not party to) as the cornerstone of climate change policy, by extending it for between five and eight years – the exact length will be decided next year in Doha. In addition the deal which was reached commits all countries to negotiate a new legal agreement by the year 2015, which will then come into force by 2020 to limit emissions to an as yet unspecified level. The question to ask now then is, has this new deal saved those countries most vulnerable to the threat of climate change?

In researching this topic I found a number of quite contrasting views and so, to try and give this post some structure I thought I would begin by looking at those who looked positively upon the outcome at Durban. 

Unsurprisingly on visiting the UNFCCC website you will be met with a self congratulatory statement which claims the deal made to be “a breakthrough on the international community's response to climate change” and goes on to quote Maite Nkoana-Mashabane a South African politician and the President of the conference who states "What we have achieved in Durban will play a central role in saving tomorrow, today."

The Guardian has an excellent piece offering the verdict of a number of important figures on the conference. Of those offering their view, Chris Huhne, the UK’s energy and climate secretary, described the conference as “a significant step forward in curbing emissions to tackle global climate change”.  Christian Figueres, the UNFCCC executive secretary congratulated all involved in reaching “a long-term solution to climate change”, even tweeting that the conference was a “remarkable new phase in climate regime”. Connie Hedegaard, European commissioner for climate action was also pleased with the outcomes due to the extension of the Kyoto Protocol which was strongly sought after by the EU. A number of other figures saw the deal as a positive outcome, purely because getting 194 nations to agree to anything is incredibly hard and so any deal must be better than none (is this really the criteria on which we should be judging the conference?). 

I have also gathered some opinions from press agencies around the world. The South Atlantic news agency MercoPress proclaims that the conference had a ‘happy ending’ as talks didn’t collapse and the Kyoto protocol was extended. The Bundesregierung website which publishes official press releases from the German cabinet describes the Durban package as “a success for global climate protection” due to the promise of a binding legal agreement by 2015. The Chinese newspaper China Daily also had praise for the Durban conference describing it’s outcomes as a ‘significant milestone’ due to the increasing clarity of the legal framework which was set out.  

I also feel that maybe I should have qualified my earlier statement, when I said ‘looked positively upon’, I meant this to mean, who felt that the agreement was a strong step towards helping to deal with the problem of climate change, as this is what I saw the aim of the conference as. However, apparently not everyone had the same view as I. Tim Gore the international climate change advisor for OXFAM reports in his blog, one of the countries which probably feels like they gained most from the agreement is the US who were able to minimize the prospect of future actions on emissions thus ensuring no deeper targets would take effect until 2020. Furthermore they didn’t commit to any deals on climate finance for developing countries.

Overall it can be seen that some are happy just because any deal was reached regardless of its content, some because they genuinely feel that what has been agreed will be effective in combating climate change and others because the deal hasn’t dictated strong emission targets upon them. So, what for those who look negatively upon the deal? 

It is not hard to find a wide range of sources which offer up extreme criticism of the Durban package, so much so, that in this post I will only touch upon some of the most vociferous condemnation of the conference, so to save you still be reading what is already a lengthy post in say an hour’s time. 

Friends of the Earth have labeled the Durban package as ‘disastrous’, and lay out a number of detailed reasons why they think that this is the case. They say that the package will delay any real climate action for a decade and has weakened the Kyoto protocol as the extension to it is unknown and it will only cover the EU and a handful of other developed countries. In addition emissions targets mean that by 2020 net emissions will increase, those least responsible for causing the problem are facing more of the burden, and there has been no progress on climate finance initiatives as well as an increased likelihood of carbon trading which they see as a false solution. 

Further damning condemnation can be seen in the video below, taken from the Climate and Convergence website, in which Aubrey Meyer a long term climate campaigner talks about the likely consequences of this agreement for small island nations.  It can be seen that the agreement means, that global CO2 emissions will peak later and global CO2 levels reach a much greater value  than the members of AOSIS feel is necessary to protect their societies from future climate change. 

Jeff Tollefson writing in nature further explains that, while the stated aim of the conference was to limit global warming to 2 ^oC , analysis by climate scientists has shown that pledges made at Durban mean that the world is much more likely to be on a course to witness 3.5 ^oC  of warming this century (the effects of different levels of cuts to emissions are well shown in the figure below). Therefore I do not think that the conference can be judged as successful if one of its main aims is going to be missed by such a large amount.

Climate response to global GHG emissions (source).

To me, the setting the agenda of the conference as limiting global warming to 2^oC hints at complete marginalization of small island nations. On visiting the AOSIS website you will see that the groups slogan contains the words ‘1.5 to stay alive’, which is a reference to the degree of warming which they feel is the maximum that can occur if their survival is to be ensured. This group of small island nations wants countries globally to aim for just a 1.5^oC temperature rise, therefore I think that setting the bar at 2 ^oC  is an insult, and then being elated with a deal which will result in a rise of up to 3.5 ^oC  an all out attack on small island nations. Once again it seems like the big industrialized nations are ignoring those most vulnerable to climate change, because the hit on their profits, and the most minimal of adaptations to their way of life would be too bigger brunt for them to bear. 

Mapping the Issue

My last post presented figures for the number of people living in low elevation coastal zones, however I am aware that simply presenting figures doesn't necessarily make it easy to visualize the full extent of the issue. A better understanding of the threat can be gained by looking at the sea level rise maps as published by The Center for Remote Sensing of Ice Sheets. On their website they have sea level rise maps for one meter increments up to a six meter rise, for eight regions of the world, as well as providing a complete global view. As well as individual images there are also movies for each region which show the area of land submerged with increasing global sea level. From these images it is easy to see the extent of land submerged and it highlights well the considerable impact that sea level rise is likely to have. 

An example of the imagery provided can be seen below, where each image shows the area of land submerged for sequential one meter increases in sea level for the Southeast Asian region.

Inundation due to Sea Level Rise (source).

The Risk of Rising Tides

Low lying coastal areas are in general disproportionally the location for both urban and environmental disasters, and climate change looks like adding to the woes of people living in such areas. The rising tides expected as a result of climate change will increase the flood risk to low lying areas, and this risk will be further enhanced by the increasingly stronger tropical storms that are expected. In this post I will use data published in a study by McGranahan et al (2007) to explore settlement patterns in low lying coastal zones and thus provide an insight into the number of people that any rise in sea level is likely to have an impact upon.

Low lying coastal areas have long been seen by humans as favourable locations for settlements as they provide a large number of important resources as well as enabling travel and trade. McGranahan et al (2007) explain that the rise of colonialism and the subsequent rise in international trade resulted in a boom in the growth of low lying coastal settlements. However, while coastal locations can be seen to have a number of favourable attributes they are also very vulnerable to flooding, especially when high tides coincide with storm surges or high river flows. With respect to flooding it is the poor which are most vulnerable as while the wealthy can choose to locate in the more suitable areas, away from the threat of rising tides, the poor are often forced to settle on flood plains as cannot afford to locate elsewhere.

By overlaying geographic data layers McGranahan et al (2007) where able to calculate the size of the population living in the low elevation coastal zone for 224 countries as well as the land area which the LECZ accounted for.  The LECZ was defined as “land area contiguous with the coastline up to a 10-metre rise elevation” using satellite radar topography measurements. Immediately it can be seen that as sea level in the 21st century is only expected to rise  maximum of 0.59cm this leaves a large margin of safety, however, the authors justify this definition as sea level rise and storm surges can affect people living well above the sea level.

Globally this study calculated that while the LECZs contain 2% of the world's land they account for around 10% of global population, therefore showing how disproportionately high settlement in these areas is. Of all regions it is the small island states which have the largest share of their land in the LECZ; the Maldives, Tuvalu, Marshall Islands, Cayman Islands and the Turk and Caicos have over 90% of their land in this zone.

The countries with the greatest population living in the LECZ are China, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Indonesia. These five countries account for around three quarters of people living in the zone with China alone having 143,880 citizens in such areas. However it is more important to look at the percentage of the total population of each country living in the zone. Of the aforementioned top five, both Bangladesh and Vietnam have a large proportion of their population living in these zones, the figure for Bangladesh is 55% and Vietnam 46%.  This means that in Bangladesh there are 62,524 people living in the LECZ and in Vietnam there are 43,051. This illustrates well that it is not just small islands at risk due to sea level rise but much larger countries where the number of people at risk is much greater. For these countries the idea of trying to move the population out of the zone is one that would be extremely difficult to execute due to the large scale of the endeavour. In addition while the LECZ for China only accounts for one-fiftieth of its total land area, in Bangladesh this figure is two-fifths and thus finding somewhere to relocate these people to is much more difficult. 

Even more worrying is that even in the face of sea level rise, in many countries the size of the population living in the LECZ is expanding, due mainly due to economic growth which is driving movement to favourable urban coastal locations.

Overall it can thus be seen that there are large numbers of people globally that are extremely vulnerable to sea level rise and that the threat posed is not simply confined to those more limited populations that inhabit small islands. It therefore highlights the importance of tackling the issue of climate change and also highlights the need for global collaboration in planning for a worst case scenario. I think the idea of global collaboration is key to this issue as many of the countries likely to be affected by rising tides are of lower income and it is therefore unlikely that alone they will have the resources to tackle what is such a large threat. It is also important that action is taken as soon as possible to implement adaptive measure, because, as I have mentioned before in this blog, the idea that mass migration is the solution to this problem is extremely unfavourable with those most under threat. In addition as shown in this post, migration is an extremely large task which would involve relocating not just a few thousand but hundreds of thousands of people.

'Climate Refugees' - A Contested Discourse

This post is somewhat of a continuation of my post about climate change sensationalism, however this time instead of focusing on the case of Tuvalu I want to broaden my focus and explore the discourses associated with the term 'climate refugee'.

The term climate refugee first emerged in 1988 in a publication by the Worldwatch Institute and since then the use of this category has become widespread in both policy documents and the media (McNamara and Gibson, 2009). However, a number of concerns have been expressed over the use of such a category and these are what I shall now explore.

Hartmann (2010) sees the term 'climate refugee' as being born from something she calls the 'degradation narrative'. In this narrative population pressure in poor countries leads to over-intensive farming practices which result in environmental degradation and thus the need for migration as the land can no longer support the incumbent population. The narrative continues that people migrate to other rural areas where this same process is then repeated or to urban areas where population growth places a strain on existing urban resources which can result in political instability.

While such a narrative has been widely critiqued it has gained popularity in western policy as it explains poverty as the result of population pressure instead of reform and in addition it blames the poor for environmental degradation while ignoring the role of commercial agriculture and extractive industries. Furthermore it frames migration as something which is both a threat to the environment and to security.

A concern expressed by Hartmann (2010), is that as the term 'climate refugee' is born from the degradation narrative it has security issues tied up with it. In this sense she sees the use of this term along with another term, 'climate conflict', as only helping to further the aims of national security actors. This is as the narrative of crisis, with which this term is linked, results in the militarisation of the issues of climate policy and development aid. As a result Hartmann thinks that this term is more likely to undermine any efforts with respect to the mitigation and adaptation to climate change and result in the blurring of the distinction between military assistance and development.

This brings me on to the next concern put forward by McNamara and Gibson (2009), which also has its foundations in the manner in which the term 'climate refugee' has been constructed. In this paper McNamara and Gibson look at how this term has been developed both by NGOs and the media. They see this term as being created through sensationalist narratives of climate catastrophe which portray those who are affected by climate change as being weak, helpless and vulnerable victims of a problem that they contributed little to. As such, the use of this term has meant that the focus of dealing with future climate change has been concentrated on where affected people can be relocated to, for example Brown (2001) proposed that the UN should create a climate-immigration quota system.

However, many of the nations facing the greatest threat due to climate change have strongly resisted the label of 'climate refugees'. While the narratives associated with this term are those of future climate catastrophe, this is not the future that those under the most severe threats envision for themselves. These people see a future where they rally against the impacts of climate change through local adaptation as well as seeking global action to mitigate future climate change. This sentiment is well evidenced by this quote by President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom of the Republic of the Maldives:

“We don’t want no sea level rise. There must be a way out. Neither the Maldives nor any small island nation wants to drown. That’s for sure. Neither do we want our lands eroded, or our economies destroyed. Nor do we want to become environmental refugees either. We want to stand up and fight. All we ask is that the more affluent nations and the international community in general, help us in this fight . ”

Rather than seeing his country and it's people as weak, vulnerable and helpless, his view is of a people who have the ability to adapt to future climate change without resorting to migration. This is the case for many societies under threat - they resist the label of 'climate refugees' as they do not want to be portrayed as weak or passive. Instead they are proud people with a deep sense of national pride who want to act to save the country that they belong to and maintain their sovereignty. Many Pacific ambassadors spoken to in the aforementioned study viewed the focus on migration as a globally irresponsible vision for the future. The point is put forward that if the only future adaptation solution discussed is migration then you lose the premise to persuade major polluters to reduce emissions and prevent any further damage to the nations that are already under threat.

McNamara and Gibson some up this issue well when they say:

“At the heart of the contestation over the category of ‘climate refugees’ is a geopolitical tension between visions for the future. The vision for the future validating the category of ‘climate refugees’ is based on Pacific islands (as weaker, marginal nations) having to adapt in the most extreme way to problems created by large, polluting nations (rather than those polluting nations curbing their own emissions as ‘the solution’). In contrast, Pacific nation ambassadors envision a future as self-determining nation-states, and thus, strongly resist media/policy discourses that legitimise their possible future displacement en masse. ”

I hope this post didn't overlap to much with my previous post about climate sensationalism however on reading these papers I felt compelled to share how a term that is widely used without second thought is actually linked to very negative discourses of future climate change, so much so that those most affected by climate change wish to avoid having this label attached to them.